Authentication of integrated circuits (ICs) throughout a supply chain is a crucial component of ensuring the security and reliability of high-consequence electronic systems, and can reduce the risk of subversion of such systems by substitution of specified components with inferior or insecure components. Physically unclonable functions (PUFs) have been used for the purpose of IC authentication. A PUF device has an output characteristic that is inherent to its physical structure and that can be readily measured, but that is also practically impossible to predict or duplicate. Thus, a PUF should consistently produce a same output given a same input, but it should be difficult to predict an expected output for any given input prior to actual measurement. By including a PUF on a high-consequence IC, a user can verify the integrity of the IC by challenging the PUF with an input having a known, previously-measured output, and comparing the PUF's response to the known output. Since the PUF's output characteristic is generally unpredictable prior to measurement, if a subverting party does not know in advance the challenge to be used and the expected response, it will be practically impossible for the attacker to substitute the IC without being detected.